This thesis will be evaluated by comparing the relative strengths of the states in Southeast Asia in traditional measures of sea power (submarine and surface platforms) and by adding a new measure--that of the anti-shipping missile (ASM). The goal is to show that not only does the number of ASMs correspond well with the more typical platform measurements, but, as a high-cost munition, also provides a useful measure of intent.
Sea power is the product of geographical position and of size and quality of the fleet. An aspiring naval power must have the ability to harness its economy to produce the large ocean-going fleet necessary to contest for control of the sea. Navies are the most capital intensive of the military arms, and only the strongest of economies can afford to build and maintain them, and have reason to (Gray 1992).
Since the dawn of recorded history, states have risen to dominance over their region and then faded into obscurity. In the industrial age this process of military surge and decline came to follow a regular pattern, tied to an economic phenomenon known as "long cycles" (Goldstein 1988). Long cycles underlie the rise of the individual nation-states, but like a gaggle of surfers, some nations are in a better position than others to catch the incoming wave.
Goldstein refers to long cycles as approximately 50 years in length, and characterized by a pattern of rises and falls in productivity, real income, and prices. At the peak of a cycle, the intensity of wars increase, and then fall off as the surplus wealth created by the burst of productivity earlier is lost. Approximately every 150 years, a change in global hegemony, accompanied by extremely intense war, takes place, tied to the long cycles. The most recent shift occurred during World War II as the United States took over the role of hegemon from Great Britain (Goldstein 1988).
Long cycle theory predicts that long stretches of economic growth in a world or region are followed by, and support, great power war. Neither Japan nor China has been in a major war since 1945 and 1953 respectively. China has fought border skirmishes with the former USSR, India, and Vietnam, but none of these reached the intensity or duration of a great power war. Japan had been enjoying a prolonged period of economic growth since World War II. It has only recently suffered a major downturn, but the long-term prospects appear undimmed. China has had a slowly accelerating pattern of economic growth since the late 1970s. The conditions seem ripe for a long cycle war.
Sea power is intimately tied to power in general. The cheapest way to move large quantities of goods and services is by sea, and until the advent of the railroad and the airplane, it was also the fastest. This productivity advantage leads to others across the board. In industry, the ability to ship by sea means lower costs, more profit, and a larger share of the market. In war, the ability to ship by sea means provisioning armies anywhere in the world with almost the same ease as supplying them in the home country. Thus with seapower comes the potential dominance of a region, and in the case of the most recent sea powers, the world (Mahan 1890).
The regional case is more problematic. In Southeast Asia there is no resident superpower. The United States presence has been reduced by the loss of the bases at Da Nang and Cam Ranh Bay, Vietnam in 1974, and Subic Bay, the Philippines in 1990 (See Figure 1). In response, the United States interest in maintaining the peace in Southeast Asia has waned. The closest US bases to the South China Sea are at Guam and Okinawa. The former is rarely used now, and the latter has come under pressure from the Okinawans to reduce its operations. The closest base capable of supporting a carrier is Yokosuka in Japan, where the USS Independence and its battlegroup is homeported.
The trend since 1974 for US military involvement in Asia is for decline. In 1990, the Base Force Concept referred to the Pacific as an "economy of force theater." This meant that the US did not regard the Pacific area as high priority. US forces in the region would be expected to make do with the forces already in the region. The main areas of emphasis for the Base Force Concept were Southwest Asia and Europe (Huxley 1993).
The US currently has treaties with Japan (Mutual Defense Agreement 1954), South Korea (Mutual Defense Treaty 1954), and the Philippines (Mutual Defense Treaty 1947) to defend those countries. These may continue to be re-evaluated as the US looks inward. The commitments may also change if the countries involved decide that they would prefer to defend themselves without the presence of foreign troops on their soil. This is a key assumption of this thesis: the US will not be involved. Any naval action will involve only the nations that border the South China Sea, plus Japan as the party most interested in the region's sealanes. The purpose of this assumption is to examine the regional forces as they have stood for the past fifty years without the skewing factor of the United States Navy to determine their ability to survive on their own. If they could, then excluding the US would be a reasonable response to the various countries national pride. If they do not have that ability to survive under Chinese pressure, then this study will indicate the areas that are needed to redress the regional balance.
The principal Russian influence in the region's naval balance has been as an arms seller. Russia is currently in the process of transferring 10 Kilo class submarines to China, along with state of the art Sukhoi-27 fighters. The Soviet Union supplied Indonesia with substantial naval armaments during the 60s and early 70s (Jane's Fighting Ships 1965, 1975 & 1995).
The other major player in Southeast Asia is the European Union. Their interests lie in the trade routes and trade relations of the region. They also sell weapons. French missiles and helicopters appear on Chinese warships, while the British and Germans build missile boats for Singapore and Brunei (Jane's Fighting Ships 1995). The United Kingdom maintains a Five Power Defense Arrangement with their former colonies of Malaysia and Singapore (the other two powers being Australia and New Zealand) . Apart from moral suasion or a ban on weapon sales, the EU currently has little real power to affect military events in the region. No EU nation will have a base in the region after the UK turns Hong Kong over the Chinese in 1997 (Gregor 1988).
Since outside powers supply a large percentage of the weaponry, their sustained support would be necessary for several of the countries in Southeast Asia to continue a long, drawn-out war. Only China and Japan are reasonably self-sufficient in ship, missile, and aircraft and have the economic size to support a large scale manufacturing effort for war. They are the emerging Great Powers of East Asia.
Taiwan and the Association of SouthEast Asian Nations' (ASEAN) are minor powers in Southeast Asia. Taiwan's position is critical to Japan's sealanes, and would be important to contain China from entering the Pacific in the same way as the Soviet Union was prevented from easy access during the Cold War from its bases at Vladivostok. Any regional attempt to contain China, or protect Japan's sealanes would need to include Taiwan to be successful. The ASEAN nations control the southern half of the Japanese supply lines, and surround the resource rich South China Sea. Since China's strategic direction is southward, these countries naval defenses are of paramount importance. They would be on the front lines of any naval battle in the region, willingly or not.
Year | Patrols |
sunk | (JANAC) |
sunk/patrol | sunk/patrol |
% | % | % |
Today, the focus of attention is on the sea lanes through the South China Sea, and the resources under and around the Spratly and Paracel Islands . All the nations surrounding the South China Sea have maritime claims on these islands, and on occasion shots have been fired. China has been in the forefront of most of these encounters, enraging alternately the Vietnamese and the Filipinos, both of whom have the claims furthest north in the islands. In 1974, the South Vietnamese and the Chinese fought over the Spratlys and Paracels (Park 1985). In May of 1995, the Chinese tried to soothe Japanese and others fears that Chinese aggressiveness would produce a maritime blockade (Tyler 1995). The need to assuage those fears is at least interesting. A naval base in the Spratlys would allow Chinese domination of the entire region, and leverage the country's large fleet of short-ranged missile boats.
In 1955 the Philippines announced the Archipelagic State Theory of international boundaries. This allowed archipelagic states to declare an outer boundary for their internal waters to be drawn from the outermost islands instead of the standard 12 mile limit for each individual island. This allowed the Philippines, and in 1957, Indonesia, to claim much larger areas of the South China Sea than before. China has also attempted to claim such straight-line boundaries for itself. Should the Chinese successfully claim all of the Spratlys and Paracels, the resulting declaration of internal waters would further compress the sealanes in the region either toward China, or up against the Philippines (Tangsubkul 1982).