

Bradford Jean-Hyuk Kim

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EMPLOYMENT

2019-present **Auburn University**, Instructor (Full-Time) in Philosophy

EDUCATION

2015-10 Apr **University of Oxford**, DPhil in Philosophy
2018 Thesis: *Aristotle on the Value of Friends* (see Dissertation Abstract below)
(viva/defense) Supervisors: Professor Terence Irwin, Associate Professor Karen Margrethe Nielsen
Examiners: Professor Roger Crisp (University of Oxford), Professor Anthony Price (Birkbeck College, University of London)
2014-2015 **University of Oxford**, MSt in Ancient Philosophy (Distinction)
Thesis: "The Relationship Between Happiness and External Goods in Aristotle"
Supervisor: Professor Terence Irwin
2010-2014 **Swarthmore College**, B.A. (GPA: 3.9/4.0) in Philosophy (Honors), Greek Minor, Latin Minor, Phi Beta Kappa
Thesis: "Moral Non-Objectivism as Moral Nihilism?"
Supervisor: Professor Peter Baumann

AREAS

Specialization: Ancient Greek and Roman Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

Competence: Comparative Philosophy (especially between Ancient Greek/Roman Philosophy and Ancient Chinese Philosophy)

LANGUAGES

Modern: English (first language), French (intermediate reading), German (intermediate reading)

Ancient/Classical: Greek (advanced), Hebrew (intermediate), Latin (advanced)

PUBLICATIONS

- "Aristotle on Friendship and the Lovable," forthcoming in the *Journal of the History of Philosophy*
- "When Aristotelian Virtuous Agents Acquire the Fine for Themselves, What are They Acquiring?," forthcoming in the *British Journal for the History of Philosophy*

TEACHING

2019-2020 **Business Ethics** (self-designed lectures, Auburn University)
2017-2018 **Latin Philosophy** (tutorials, University of Oxford)
Plato: *Euthyphro* and *Meno* (tutorials, University of Oxford)
Ethics (tutorials, University of Oxford)
Plato: *Republic* (tutorials, University of Oxford)
Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* on Friendship (self-designed lectures, University of Oxford)
Aristotle: *Nicomachean Ethics* (tutorials, University of Oxford)

INVITED TALKS

- 2018 **“Nicomachean Ethics VIII.7: Friendship, Justice, and Equality”**
- Aristotle Workshop: *Nicomachean Ethics* VIII.1-7, Union College
- “Aristotle on Self-Love and Maximizing the Fine for Oneself”**
- The Ancient Philosophy Triangle Graduate Colloquium (Oxford-Cambridge-KCL-UCL), University College London
- “Aristotle on Loving Other Selves”**
- Workshop in Ancient Philosophy, University of Oxford

PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITIES

- 2017-2018 **Referee**, *Polis: The Journal for Ancient Greek Political Thought*
- Organizer**, Oxford Graduate Ancient Philosophy Work in Progress Group
- Organized applications and scheduled presentations
 - Chaired presentations
- 2016-2017 **MSt Ancient Philosophy Student Representative**
- Orientation programme and Q&A sessions
 - Organized community/social events
- Committee Member**, Oxford Philosophy Ockham Society (Graduate Presentations)
- Webmaster
 - Organized applications and scheduled presentations
 - Chaired presentations
- Committee Member**, 20th Oxford Philosophy Graduate Conference
- Webmaster
 - Received, anonymized, and distributed submissions for review
 - Handled conference email
 - Booked venue and created schedule
 - Organized accommodation for three keynotes and twelve student speakers
- 2015-2016 **Committee Member**, Oxford Philosophy Ockham Society
- Committee Member**, 20th Oxford Philosophy Graduate Conference

AWARDS AND FELLOWSHIPS

- 2018 **Philosophical Fellowship Fund Postdoctoral Fellowship (University of Oxford)**, to fund research 2018-9
- 2017 **Philosophy Faculty Graduate Lecturing Scheme Award (University of Oxford)**, to teach self-designed lecture series “Aristotle’s *Nicomachean Ethics* on Friendship” in Fall Term 2017
- 2015 **Award for MSt Distinction (St. Edmund Hall, Oxford)**
- Best of Issue Award**; “Untangling the Knot that is Kant’s ‘Moral Feeling’” voted by Executive Council of Phi Sigma Tau, the International Honor Society of Philosophy, as best paper of *Dialogue: Journal of Phi Sigma Tau* 57.1 (October 2014, submitted June 2013)
- 2014 **Hannah A. Leedom Fellowship (Swarthmore College)**, to fund University of Oxford MSt in Ancient Philosophy

- 2013 **Phi Beta Kappa Honor Society (Swarthmore College)**
The Class of 1962 Student Summer Fellowship (Swarthmore College), to
 fund Senior Honors Thesis Research
Susan P. Cobbs Scholarship (Swarthmore College) for most outstanding
 student of classics in the senior class
- 2011 **Helen North Scholarship (Swarthmore College)**, to fund Summer Intensive
 Introductory Ancient Greek

DISSERTATION ABSTRACT

Recent scholarship often understands Aristotelian friendship to be non-egoistic. I reject this in my dissertation, *Aristotle on the Value of Friends*. In Chapter 1, I argue that *Nicomachean Ethics* VIII.2's basic principle of friendship, that all friends love only because of the lovable, is egoistic. 'The lovable' refers to one's own happiness and 'because of' tracks at least the final cause or end; so friends love only for the sake of their own happiness. In Chapter 2, I explore some types of concern that do *not* seem egoistic: wishing goods for the sake of the other and loving the other for himself. I argue that the other person's virtue that is at the heart of these types of concern is valued because of its contribution to *one's own* virtuous activity, which is the most important part of *one's own happiness*. In Chapter 3, I explore another type of concern that is often understood as non-egoistic: loving another as another self. I assess the first two instances of the notion in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, in VIII.12 and IX.4, and argue for an egoistic interpretation of other selfhood. The essential feature of other selfhood, what makes other selves valuable, is their involvement in *one's own* virtuous activity. I then show how the last two instances, in IX.9, support an egoistic reading of other selfhood; Aristotle argues that the happy person needs other selves for the self-knowledge that is required for happiness. In Chapter 4, I assess the endorsement in *Nicomachean Ethics* IX.8 of praiseworthy self-love. I argue that praiseworthy self-love involves self-prioritization that is both operant at the level of motivation and substantive; an egoistic model emerges. The self-prioritization here involves maximizing the superlatively valuable fine (*to kalon*) for oneself, which manifests itself in promoting the common good. To completely show that this is egoistic, I address the issue of what it is that virtuous agents are maximizing when they maximize the fine for themselves; I argue that what they are maximizing is their own virtuous activity.