Eric Marcus

Professor, Department of Philosophy, Auburn University

My first book, Rational Causation (Harvard University Press 2012), has been reviewed in Analysis (Sara Worley), The Journal of Moral Philosophy (John Schwenkler), The Philosophers’ Magazine (Clayton Littlejohn), Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (James A. Montmarquet), Metapsychology (George Tudorie) and Reason Papers (Bernardo Aguilera). Analysis has also published a précis, Kieran Setiya’s portion of an APA session on Rational Causation and my reply. An interview, part of the New Books in Philosophy podcast series, is here.

My new book, Belief, Inference, and the Self-Conscious Mind is now available from Oxford University Press.

Papers:

Aesthetic Knowledge: Philosophical Studies (with Keren Gorodeisky) (forthcoming)
Wanting and Willing: European Journal of Philosophy (forthcoming)
Anscombe and the Difference Rationality Makes: forthcoming in Anscombean Minds (eds.) Adrian Haddock and Rachael Wiseman
Inference as Consciousness of Necessity: Analytic Philosophy 2020; 61 (4): 304-322
Reconciling Practical Knowledge with Self-Deception: Mind 2019; 128 (512): 1205-1225
Assertion and Transparent Self-Knowledge: Canadian Journal of Philosophy (with John Schwenkler) 2019; 49 (7): 873-889
Practical Knowledge as Knowledge of a Normative Judgment: Manuscrito 2018; 41, (4): 319-347
Aesthetic Rationality: Journal of Philosophy (with Keren Gorodeisky) 2018; 115 (3): 113-140, Winner of the 2020 Arthur Danto/American Society for Aesthetics Prize
To Believe is to Know that You Believe: dialectica 2016; 70, (3): 375–405
Why There Are No Token States: The Journal of Philosophical Research 2009; 34: 215- 241
Intentionalism and the Imaginability of the Inverted Spectrum: The Philosophical Quarterly 2006; 56: 321-339
Events, Sortals, and the Mind-Body Problem: Synthese 2006; 150: 99-129
Mental Causation in a Physical World: Philosophical Studies 2005; 122: 27-50
Why Zombies are Inconceivable: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 2004; 82 (3): 477-490
Mental Causation: Unnaturalized, But Not Unnatural: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 2001; 63(1): 57-83