Working Papers

  • (with Price Fishback, Yiyu Xing, and Nicolas L. Ziebarth) Beyond the Clock: Labor Market Effects of Gender-Specific Workweek Restrictions

    DRAFT (PDF) During the 1960s and 1970s, states across the US repealed laws that imposed limits on how many hours women could work in certain industries. We find that the repeal of these laws led to similar labor market effects for both men and women. In particular, the average workweek increases in length and fewer people left the previously affected industries. In addition, both hourly and annual earnings fell. The effects for women are consistent with a model in which male and female labor are complements in production and removing a workweek limit expands the supply of female labor. However, to explain the effects for men, it must be that repealing the female specific workweek limit also expanded the supply of male labor.
  • (with José-Antonio Espín-Sánchez and Joseph Ferrie) The Econometrics of Family Trees: A Cookbook

    DRAFT (PDF) We present a Non-Linear Instrumental Variable (NLIV) structure for the analysis of intergenerational mobility consistent with the realities of mating and reproduction. Existing models of the transmission of (dis)advantage are special cases of this framework embodying specific assumptions, many of them testable. In analyses of intergenerational mobility in the U.S. 1870-1979 and Spain 1700-1800, mothers contributed more than fathers to outcomes children’s in the former setting, but the reverse was true in the latter. We further show how consideration of assortative mating and the impact of mothers can produce novel conclusions regarding mobility levels, trends over time, and mechanisms.
  • (with Nicolas L. Ziebarth) The Effects of the National War Labor Board on Labor Income Inequality

    DRAFT (PDF) During World War II, the United States federal government instituted an explicit policy of wage controls through the National War Labor Board. These wage controls, which differed by industry, occupation, and geographic region, specified maximum allowable raises for those earning less than a certain level (the so-called "bracket") and froze wages greater than that level. We find that higher brackets were associated with relative decreases in inequality as measured by the change in the log(Q10/Q90) and log(Q25/Q75) ratios between 1939 and 1959 as well as 1969. There are no effects detectable from 1979 onward.

Published Papers (by Topic)