Working Papers

  • (with Price Fishback, Yiyu Xing, and Nicolas L. Ziebarth) Effects of Gender-Specific Workweek Restrictions

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    During the 1960s and 1970s, states repealed laws that limited how many hours women could work in certain industries. Repeal increased women’s work beyond the old statutory limit and raised average weekly hours for both women and men. It also reduced flows out of covered industries for both genders. Women’s hourly and annual earnings fell by roughly 4 to 6 percent, while men’s earnings showed no significant change. Taken together, the results point to expanded female labor supply, complementarity between male and female labor in production, and household labor-supply adjustment among married couples.

  • (with José-Antonio Espín-Sánchez and Joseph Ferrie) The Econometrics of Family Trees: A Cookbook

    Draft (PDF) We present a Non-Linear Instrumental Variable (NLIV) structure for the analysis of intergenerational mobility consistent with the realities of mating and reproduction. Existing models of the transmission of (dis)advantage are special cases of this framework embodying specific assumptions, many of them testable. In analyses of intergenerational mobility in the U.S. 1870-1979 and Spain 1700-1800, mothers contributed more than fathers to children’s outcomes in the former setting, but the reverse was true in the latter. We further show how consideration of assortative mating and the impact of mothers can produce novel conclusions regarding mobility levels, trends over time, and mechanisms.
  • (with Nicolas L. Ziebarth) The Effects of the National War Labor Board on Labor Income Inequality

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    During World War II, the United States federal government instituted an explicit policy of wage controls, which specified maximum allowable raises for those earning less than a certain level (the "bracket") and froze wages for those earning more. We find that in 1979, three decades after the policy ended, higher brackets were associated with slower inequality growth as measured by the log ratio of the 50th to 90th percentiles of labor earnings. However, the effect on inequality at the bottom as measured by changes in the 10-50 log ratio was more ambiguous. The lower-tail compressive effect of the brackets was stronger where union density was higher, consistent with a role for unions in perpetuating the effects of the bracket through the wage bargaining process.

Published Papers (by Topic)