Working Papers

  • (with Price Fishback, Yiyu Xing, and Nicolas L. Ziebarth) Beyond the Clock: Labor Market Effects of Gender-Specific Workweek Restrictions

    DRAFT (PDF) During the 1960s and 1970s, states across the US repealed laws that imposed limits on how many hours women could work in certain industries. We find that the repeal of these laws led to similar labor market effects for both men and women. In particular, the average workweek increases in length and fewer people left the previously affected industries. In addition, both hourly and annual earnings fell. The effects for women are consistent with a model in which male and female labor are complements in production and removing a workweek limit expands the supply of female labor. However, to explain the effects for men, it must be that repealing the female specific workweek limit also expanded the supply of male labor.
  • (with Jose Espin and Joseph Ferrie) The Mismeasure of Women: Intergenerational Mobility and the Econometrics of Family Trees

    DRAFT (PDF) We present an econometric structure for the analysis of intergenerational mobility that integrates the role of the maternal contribution to the transmission of (dis)advantage with the already well-documented paternal contribution. Our structure does this in ways that are consistent with the realities of both mating and reproduction. We show how previously estimated models are special cases of this general framework and what specific assumptions - many of them testable – each embeds. In a new empirical analysis of intergenerational income mobility from 1870 to 1940, we find that mothers contributed considerably more than fathers to the adult incomes of their children. Our analysis reveals the extent to which inadequate consideration of assortative mating and the impact of mothers can produce misleading conclusions regarding mobility levels, trends over time, and mechanisms.
  • (with Nicolas L. Ziebarth) The Effects of the National War Labor Board on Labor Income Inequality

    DRAFT (PDF) During World War II, the United States federal government instituted an explicit policy of wage controls through the National War Labor Board. These wage controls, which differed by industry, occupation, and geographic region, specified maximum allowable raises for those earning less than a certain level (the so-called "bracket") and froze wages greater than that level. We find that higher brackets were associated with relative decreases in inequality as measured by the change in the log(Q10/Q90) and log(Q25/Q75) ratios between 1939 and 1959 as well as 1969. There are no effects detectable from 1979 onward.
  • (with Eric Loualiche and Nicolas L. Ziebarth) Firm Networks in the Great Depression

    DRAFT (PDF) (forthcoming, Journal of Economic History ) We study how firms allocate resources across their constituent establishments in response to local economic shocks in the context of the Great Depression. Using establishment-level data from the Census of Manufactures, we find that establishments are affected by local shocks in the regions where the other establishments making up the same firm are located. In particular, establishment employment is positively affected by positive shocks to the local supply of credit to other establishments that make up the same firm. These results show the important role of firms in the geographic propagation of local economic shocks.
  • (with Nicolas L. Ziebarth) Can the Great Compression be Explained by Wartime Wage Controls?

    DRAFT (PDF) (forthcoming, Explorations in Economic History ) The wage controls of the National War Labor Board (NWLB) have been credited with contributing to the decline in income inequality from 1940 to 1950 that occurred along many different dimensions including across regions and occupations. We calculate an upper bound for the effect of the NWLB during this decade by assuming the controls were maximally binding. While, at the upper bound, the controls could explain an important fraction of cross-region convergence, they likely had little effect on inequality between occupations. Moreover, because of sorting by race and education into occupations, the controls cannot explain much of the narrowing of the educational skill premium nor the racial gap. We conclude that the controls are not a "one size fits all" explanation for the Great Compression.

Published Papers (by Topic)